In past essays, I have argued that ethics can be derived through a purely naturalistic methodology, describing appropriate courses of action as manifestations of certain virtues of character. Virtue theory is possibly the most ancient moral framework, and has proven amenable to various contradictory accounts-the virtues of Aristotle notably conflict with the virtues of Thomas Aquinas, and both are distinct from the virtues of Confucious. I have argued that virtues can be delineated in reference to worthwhile goals, and these goals can be understood in reference to concrete entities. This is typically and unfortunately well-known as the “is-ought” problem.
On Delineating the Virtues
On Delineating the Virtues
On Delineating the Virtues
In past essays, I have argued that ethics can be derived through a purely naturalistic methodology, describing appropriate courses of action as manifestations of certain virtues of character. Virtue theory is possibly the most ancient moral framework, and has proven amenable to various contradictory accounts-the virtues of Aristotle notably conflict with the virtues of Thomas Aquinas, and both are distinct from the virtues of Confucious. I have argued that virtues can be delineated in reference to worthwhile goals, and these goals can be understood in reference to concrete entities. This is typically and unfortunately well-known as the “is-ought” problem.